In mergers and acquisitions, information asymmetry models show that merger returns for the bidder are significantly negative when the choice of payment method is stock. However, studies in the banking industry show that that merger returns for the bidder are positive in the case of cash offer, stock offers and combined offers i.e. they contradict the information asymmetry models. Recent studies on mergers in the Indian banking industry also show similar results. We present the first case of a banking merger where merger returns for the bidder are significantly negative when the method of payment is stock i.e. we present support for informational asymmetry models in the banking industry. We study the ICICI Bank -Bank of Rajasthan merger and show that the loss for ICICI shareholders was 4.29%, while the gain for Bank of Rajasthan shareholders was 44.86%.
Introduction

Introduction to the Problem
The relationship between merger returns and the choice of payment method has been studied for quite some time now. Two main theories have tried to explain the impact of payment method on merger returns: (1) information asymmetry models and (2) taxation hypothesis. There is a lot of empirical evidence supporting the information asymmetry models and weak evidence supporting the taxation hypothesis. Information asymmetry models say that merger returns for the bidder are significantly negative for stock offers and significantly positive for cash offers. However, information asymmetry models were called into question by Cornett and De (1991) in their paper on the banking industry. They show that in the case of interstate banks' mergers, bidder's shareholders have positive abnormal returns which are significant at the 1% level, in cash offers, stock offers and combined offers.
In this paper, we present the first evidence from the banking industry which supports the information asymmetry models. We study the merger between ICICI Bank and Bank of Rajasthan (BOR) which was announced on May 18, 2010, approved by the Board of Directors of ICICI on May 24, 2010 and approved by the Reserve Bank of India on August 12, 2010. The merger has taken place when the banking industry in India is looking to undergo consolidation. ICICI was motivated by the fact that it would be able to expand its branches in northern and western India. Financial strength and governance of BOR was and hence its shareholders were happy to merge with ICICI which had a stronger capital base and governance structure. The final price decided was Rs. 3,041 crore and was paid through share swaps (BOR: ICICI -118: 25). The gain for BOR shareholders was 44.86% in a 3 day window around the merger announcement (statistically significant at 1% level) and the loss for ICICI shareholders was 4.29% (statistically significant at 5% level).
Relevant Scholarship
The impact of the choice of the payment method on the shareholders' wealth has been studied for a long time. When we talk about the returns earned by the bidder, Travlos (1987) reports negative abnormal returns when the operation is financed with stocks but positive abnormal returns when it is financed with cash. Antoniou and Zhao (2004) show that bidders' returns are lower when the operation is financed in stocks than in case of alternative, combined and cash offers. Many other empirical studies (Huang & Walking, 1987; Franks, Harris, & Mayer, 1988; Eckbo & Langohr, 1989) , confirm that the choice of payment method has an impact on the profitability of a takeover. According to these information asymmetry models developed by Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989) based on Myers and Majluf (1984) , the abnormal returns are significantly negative when the operation is financed with stocks but do not show that the performance of the investment is low, since the choice of the payment method reveals private information of the bidder concerning the value or the synergies of both firms. Information asymmetry models were called into question by Cornett and De (1991) who, through a study of interstate banks' mergers between 1982 and 1986, show that the bidder's shareholders have positive abnormal returns which are significant in cash offers, stock offers and combined offers. This result contradicts the previous studies on this issue and seems to be inconsistent with the theory of informational asymmetry. In the case of Indian banking industry, Anand and Singh (2008) study five mergers to capture returns to shareholders as a result of merger announcements. They show positive abnormal returns for the shareholders of the bidder bank, irrespective of the payment method. Thus, even they present results which contradict the information asymmetry models. The literature at this point, thus, has not presented any evidence from the banking industry which supports information asymmetry models.
The ICICI-Bank of Rajasthan Merger
We study in detail the merger of ICICI Bank and Bank of Rajasthan which was announced on May 18, 2010.  It offered a strategic fit, as it would add to ICICI's branch network in northern and western India. It was estimated that it would save ICICI about three years time to market. In the normal course, it would take about a year to set up 500 branches and then three years for those branches to come up to the kind of deposit levels.
 ICICI Bank was facing stiff competition from HDFC Bank and also the resurging Axis Bank. To remain as the top private player, it would need to grow bigger. Growth by acquisition had always been ICICI's preferred way, as is clear from its history  BOR had considerable business of state government corporations and bodies (eg, roadways, JDA, University, RIICO etc). So this would give ICICI a chance to build new relationships 1.3.3.2 Motivation for Bank of Rajasthan  Bank of Rajasthan had an opportunity to combine its branch network with ICICI's strong capital base, hence making the bank much safer due to higher capital adequacy ratio  The bank had been in trouble due to Corporate Governance issues related to the promoter. The ex-promoter Tayal Group had been asked by RBI to reduce their stake in BOR and trading by the promoters on the stock market was banned by SEBI  The promoter was arrested by SEBI, alleging that he still held a controlling stake in the bank through a chain of 'front companies' which were holding shares for him  SEBI also banned around 100 other entities from trading in BOR shares because they were supposedly the front companies trading on behalf of Mr. Tayal  The real estate position of BOR was not transparent and the investments in properties were complicated structures  In light of this background, it was extremely beneficial to the shareholders to merge with a bank like ICICI which would make the company stronger in corporate governance and more transparent in its operations and asset values
The Merger: Chronology of Events
The chronology of all relevant events is given in Table 1 , below. 
Method
Choice of Event Date and Period
The Merger of ICICI with BOR was announced on 18 th May 2010 and was approved by the board of ICICI on 24 th May 2010. Hence, these two dates have been chosen for the event studies. To estimate the coefficients, a clean window of 6 months prior to announcement has been used. The merger was approved by RBI and executed on 12 th August 2010.
Data Description and Sources
Industry Study
Industry study and its related data were obtained first from credible academic sources such as journals and magazines. After this, the popular google search engine was used to browse websites. The data available from different websites were cross checked against one another and they were accepted only when there was consistency.
Events
The events were first searched in the CMIE data base. Thereafter, using google and various other websites were browsed for further information. The list of references is provided at the end. Using judgment, those events were selected which were thought to have some new information about the Merger and those which would create www.ccsenet.org/ijef
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Stock Market Data
Share price and market capitalization data for the two companies, and BSE SENSEX index, from Nov 2009 to August 2010, was collected from CMIE and cross checked with BSE's website. During this period there was no stock splits, rights issues, etc. for any of the two companies. In line with standard practice the daily closing price was used for the share prices as well as the BSE SENSEX index.
Methodology Used and Justification
To study the events, four windows were used around 18 th May and 24 th May: 3 days (-1,+1), 11 days (-5,+5), 21 days (-10,+10) and 81 days (-40,+40) . To measure the impact of the merger on the share prices of the two companies, the component of the return of the stock price due the merger related events are required to be isolated. Since stock prices moves with the market, the realized returns are adjusted for the market wide movements. For estimating the coefficients of the market model, a clean period is chosen and the market model is estimated by running a regression for the days in this period. The market model is:
where R mt is the return on a market index (for example, the BSE Sensex) for day t,β j measures the sensitivity of firm j to the market, this is, a measure of risk, α j measures the mean return over the period not explained by the market, and ∈jt is a statistical error term with
. The regression produces estimates of α j and β j ; call these β αˆj j and . The predicted return for a firm for a day in the event period, is the return given by the market model on that day using these estimates. That is:
where now R mt is the return on the market index for the actual day in the event period. Since the market model takes explicit account of both the risk associated with the market and mean returns, it is the most widely used method.
As explained above, to estimate the Abnormal Returns (or Prediction Error or PE),
The t-statistic are calculated as:
where PE jt is the prediction error from the estimates market models and VAR (PE jt ) is the variance of the prediction error.
where σ 2 j is the residual variance from the market model regression: N is the number of observations used to estimate the market model; R mt is the market return on day t ; Rm are the mean and variance of the market return over the estimation period.
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the event windows is calculated as shown below:
The abnormal returns of two events were found to be significant on the date of the events and those immediately following it. These events were taken up for detail analysis taking four sets of windows o varying length for each.
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Results
Market Model Estimates
Gains of Merger
The event study was done around two dates, 18 th May 2010 and 24 th May 2010 and was made with four windows. It was observed that during those windows around the event there were significant abnormal positive returns for BOR and significant abnormal negative returns for ICICI.
We find that BOR shareholders gained 44.86% in the 3 days around the announcement of the merger and another 20.13% in the 3 days around the approval by ICICI board. Both these gains were significant at 1% level. ICICI shareholders however lost 4.29% in the 3 days around the merger announcement (significant at 5% level). On relative valuation parameters, the proposed acquisition appears quite expensive when compared with the peers' valuation but on price per branch perspective the acquisition is much cheaper compared to HDFC Bank-CBoP transaction.
Discussion
Impact of Merger on Industry Structure, Rivals and Others
The impact of the merger on the industry was negligible. However, it was a small step in the consolidation of the banking industry.
4.1.1 Impact on ICICI and Its Rivals ICICI was facing competition from other private banks like HDFC Bank prior to the merger. To remain the top private bank, ICICI needed to grow. Acquiring BOR helped in increasing not just their customer base and size of loan book, but it also saved ICICI three years time to market with respect to growth of fully operational branches.
Impact on BOR
BOR shareholders were benefited extremely from this deal. They gain more than 70% in the 81 day window in this deal. Apart from that, they are now shareholders of a bank with a stronger capital base and stronger corporate governance set-up. Customers of BOR will now enjoy world class personal banking services and a wider range of more sophisticated products.
Contribution of the Paper
This paper presents the first evidence from the banking industry in support of information asymmetry models of merger gains. We show that the gain for BOR shareholders was 44.86% in a 3 day window around the merger announcement (statistically significant at 1% level) and the loss for ICICI shareholders was 4.29% (not statistically significant), even though it was a stock offer. Myers, S., & Maljuf, N. (1984 
